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SYNOPSIS
This Article analyses recent bankruptcy cases that address whether
exemptions shielding an IRA from the IRA owner’s creditors should also
shield an inherited IRA from the beneficiary’s creditors. The Article goes
on to consider alternative options to protect an inherited IRA, such as
through the use of a spendthrift trust.

INTRODUCTION
Generally, an original depositor’s Individual Retirement Account
(“IRA”) is exempt from creditors in bankruptcy; however the status of
inherited IRAs is unclear. Current case law appears, with very few exceptions, to take the position that beneficiaries of inherited IRAs do not receive asset protection in bankruptcy. In fact, of the cases reported to date
dealing with beneficiaries of inherited IRAs, nine found that the inherited
IRAs were not exempt from the beneficiary’s estate in bankruptcy,1 while
1 In re Sims, 241 B.R. 467 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999); In re Greenfield, 289 B.R. 146
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2003); In re Navarre, 332 B.R. 24 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004); In re Taylor,
2006 WL 1275400 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 9, 2006); In re Kirchen, 344 B.R. 908 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Jarboe, 365 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007); Robertson v. Deeb,
16 So.3d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); In re Chilton, 426 B.R. 612 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2010); In re Klipsch, 435 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010).
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only three upheld the bankruptcy exemption.2 A consistent theme in these
decisions is that Congress did not contemplate asset protection for anyone
other than the initial IRA owner (or the IRA owner’s spouse after a
spousal rollover); its goal was to ensure the availability of assets during
the owner’s retirement.
Although the outcome of these cases has been consistent, the means
by which the courts have made their decisions varies, thus leaving little
guidance for predicting how the next case will be decided. Although
bankruptcy law is federal law decided in federal bankruptcy courts, many
states have opted out of the federal bankruptcy scheme.3 A compilation
of the state statutes and effective dates by which various states have opted
out of the federal exemption scheme is listed in Exhibit A. Many state
courts apply the relevant state exemption statute, either because the state
has opted out of the federal exemptions or because the debtor has a choice
and chooses the state exemption. Of course, the applicable state statutes
vary greatly.
This issue is significant not only because more families in the United
States are facing creditor problems, but also due to the fact that many
American families are largely placing the bulk of their wealth into retirement accounts. Any portion of this money not depleted during retirement
by the IRA owner will likely be left to spouses and descendants when the
owner dies.
I. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LAWS
A. Bankruptcy Law
In the leading case of Patterson v. Shumate,4 the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously confirmed a Fourth Circuit opinion that the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) provided that the anti-alienation provisions of a qualified pension plan constituted a restriction on transfer
2 In re McClelland, 2008 WL 89901; 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 41 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan.
7, 2008); In re Nessa, 426 B.R. 312 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010); In re Tabor, 433 B.R. 469
(Bankr. M.D. Penn. 2010).
3 States may opt out in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2010). Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming have opted out.
WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III, NANCY FRAAS MACLEAN,
Bankr. Exemption Manual § 4:2 (2010). See infra Exhibit A for a list of statutes by which
these states have opted out of the federal bankruptcy system, and see infra Exhibit B for
a list of all of the state exemption statutes addressing retirement plans.
4 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
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enforceable under “applicable non-bankruptcy Law” for purposes of the
pre-2005 exemption provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 541(c). The antialienation provisions for qualified plan benefits are found in
§ 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (the
“Code” or “IRC”). These rules do not apply, however to IRAs, Simplified Employee Pension Plans (“SEPs”) or similar plans not qualified
under Code § 401(a).
In response to Shumate, numerous cases narrowed the meaning of
“qualified plan” and often excluded plans that failed some aspect of ERISA qualification. IRAs are not ERISA qualified, so this was problematic under pre-2005 law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in
Rousey v. Jacoway5 that an owner-established IRA was covered by the
Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10(E)) exemption, but limited this exemption to payments reasonably necessary for the IRA owner (and
debtor’s) support.
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(“BAPCPA”) amended the Bankruptcy Code for bankruptcy filings after October 16, 2005, and so § 522(d)(12) now exempts “[r]etirement
funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is
exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or
501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”6 Nevertheless, Bankruptcy Code § 522(n) limits this exemption for IRAs and Roth IRAs to
$1,000,000, except for rollovers. Interestingly, this limitation is currently
relatively meaningless since contributory IRAs would rarely reach the
$1,000,000 level. Rollovers from qualified plans can, and often do, however, exceed several million dollars.
As it now reads, § 522(d) exempts “[r]etirement funds to the extent
that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation
under section. . .408. . .of the IRC.”7 Take note, however, that § 522(d)
is silent with regard to inherited IRAs.
B. State Exemptions
Prior to BAPCPA, most states adopted “Shield Statutes” which exempt IRAs from claims of creditors. Unfortunately for many debtors,
Bankruptcy Code § 522(b) permits each state to decide whether debtors
are limited to state law exemptions by “opting out” of the Federal bankruptcy system. The various state statutes by which states “opt out” are
listed in Exhibit A. The majority of states opt out, and the bankruptcy
5

Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561 (2005).
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) (2010).
7 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) (2010); 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) (2010). Notice that 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) is included in the state “opt out” provision and that § 408 of the
Internal Revenue Code is the section concerning IRAs.
6
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exemptions are therefore decided under specific state laws. Although
most states exclude “qualified plans,” not all exclude IRAs. Many also
have limitations on how much can be excluded. Yet even the decisions
that hold inherited IRAs not exempt from bankruptcy all appear to
agree that during the life of the account owner, the IRA was exempt.
If the state exemption statutes specifically included “inherited
IRAs,” it seems these IRAs would be exempt and there would be no
room for debate or interpretation, judicial or otherwise. Unfortunately,
at the time of this writing, there do not appear to be any state statutes
that contain such a reference (and many state statutes predate inherited
IRAs).
Instead, the state statutes use the terms “IRA” or “similar plan,”
which provides courts with the opportunity to create their own interpretation rather than following the plain meaning of the statute. The approaches taken by the various state statutes are summarized in Exhibit
B. The majority of statutes require a retirement plan to be qualified or
established under the IRC prior to it being considered exempt by state
law, or use some type of comparable language. Some state statutes require that retirement plans have tax-deferred funds, or be exempt from
taxation in order to be exempt in bankruptcy. Other states statutes focus on plans exempt on account of age unless they do not qualify under
the IRC. There are various approaches to determining what “qualified”
means: approaches include plans “intended in good faith to qualify”
under the IRC or which are “determined based on all of the relevant
facts and circumstances.”8 The approach used may be significant in predicting how the bankruptcy courts will determine the application to inherited IRAs in those states where no case law yet exists.
C. Tax Aspects of Inherited IRAs
IRAs are a form of a retirement account established in accordance
with IRC § 408. Under the statutory framework established by Congress, an IRA owner may make tax deductible contributions to an IRA,
and must begin taking distributions following the later of the calendar
year in which the individual retires or April 1st of the calendar year in
which the individual attains the age 70 1/2.9 Distributions from an IRA
are taxable as gross income unless the distributions qualify as a rollover
contribution to another exempt account.10
8

See Exhibit B for a list of the approaches taken by the various state statutes.
See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(9)(C)(i) (2010) (required beginning date); see also 26
U.S.C. § 408(d)(1) (2010) (tax treatment of distributions).
10 See 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(1) (2010) (tax treatment of distributions); see also 26
U.S.C. § 408(d)(3) (2010) (rollover contribution).
9
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An inherited IRA is an IRA which is left to a beneficiary when the
owner of the IRA dies. Inherited IRAs are an IRA classification recognized by § 408(d). Under that section, an IRA will be “treated as inherited if the individual for whose benefit the account. . .is maintained
acquired such account by reason of a death of another individual,
and. . .such individual was not the surviving spouse of such other
individual.”11
One of the differences between an IRA inherited by a spouse and
an IRA inherited by someone else is that the spouse is allowed to treat
the IRA as his or her own by making contributions or doing a rollover
into the spouse’s own IRA.12 This option is not available for nonspouse beneficiaries.13
Inherited IRAs are subject to different rules regarding the use, distribution, and taxation of their funds when compared with regular IRAs
(unless, of course, the inheritor is a spouse). The inheritor cannot “rollover” the account into another IRA or make nondeductible contributions to the account.14 Additionally, if the inheritor retains the assets in
the original IRA, he or she will lose any tax deferral benefits because he
or she must withdraw all the funds in the account over a relatively short
time (usually five years).15 Further, if the inheritor decides to put the
assets into an inherited IRA, he or she can stretch out the withdrawals
over his or her expected lifetime, which certainly is more appealing from
a tax deferral standpoint.
II. ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY CASES RE: INHERITED IRAS
A. In re Sims
In re Sims was decided in Oklahoma in 1999 and was the forerunner of case law analyzing inherited IRAs in a bankruptcy context.16 The
debtor in Sims filed bankruptcy and utilized the state exemption statute
because Oklahoma opts out of the federal exemption scheme. Although
11

26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (2010).
I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(C) (inherited IRA may not be treated as a tax-free rollover;
defining inherited IRA as an IRA acquired by reason of the participant’s death by someone other than the participant’s spouse; by implication, the spouse may treated inherited
IRA as tax-free rollover); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-5(a) (surviving spouse may treat IRA
“as the spouse’s own IRA”); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-5(b) (election to treat IRA as surviving spouse’s own IRA may be made by affirmative election or by making contribution
to the IRA); Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, A-7 (surviving spousal rollover IRA may be treated as
the spouse’s own IRA for purposes of determining required minimum distributions).
13 I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(C).
14 See 26 U.S.C. § 408(d)(3)(C)(i)(11) (2010).
15 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(ii). This code provision is triggered by I.R.C.
§ 408(a)(6) of the IRA provisions.
16 In re Sims, 241 B.R. 467 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999).
12
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IRAs are considered exempt under the Oklahoma statute when they are
“qualified for tax exemption or deferment,” they are not exempt when
the debtor’s interest is in an inherited IRA.17 The Sims court carefully
examined the intent of the state legislature in establishing exemptions
for debtors and compared that intent to the purpose for which the
debtor was utilizing his inherited IRA. The court found that exemption
statutes exist to “prevent improvident debtors from becoming subjects
of charity” by leaving debtors with sufficient assets. Specifically, the
court found that the Oklahoma legislature exempted IRAs “to allow
debtors to preserve assets which have been earmarked for retirement.”18 By statute, the debtor in Sims would have had to withdraw all
of the assets contained in his share of the inherited IRA long before he
reached retirement age. Although the debtor had never contributed to
his inherited IRA, the court found that the inherited IRA “became a
liquid asset” in the hands of the debtor which he could access at will and
thus did not fall within what the court believed to be the state legislature’s intent in exempting regular IRAs. The court concluded that the
IRA interest at issue must be “qualified for tax exemption purposes” in
order to be exempt under state law and that inherited IRAs do not qualify under the IRC for special tax treatment and as such, cannot be exempt in bankruptcy proceedings in Oklahoma.
B. In re Greenfield
In re Greenfield was decided about four years later in California
and was modeled after Sims.19 The forty-one year old debtor inherited a
one-third interest in an IRA from her mother and had been taking regular disbursements as required by the IRC. The debtor tried to establish
that her inherited IRA was exempt under the California exemption statute.20 The Greenfield court ultimately held that the inherited IRA at
issue was not exempt under California law.21 In opting out of the federal exemption scheme, California exempted certain retirement “plan[s]
or contract[s] on account of. . .age.”22 In its analysis, the court noted
that the Ninth Circuit had previously construed the California exemption statute to apply to IRAs “in general” because they “enable working
taxpayers to accumulate assets during their productive years so that they
might draw upon them during retirement.”23 The court emphasized that
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

See OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(A)(20) (2007).
In re Sims, 241 B.R. at 471.
In re Greenfield, 289 B.R. 146 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2003).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 150.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.140(b)(10)(E) (2010).
In re Greenfield, 289 B.R. at 150.
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“in order to qualify for an exemption the IRA must be used for retirement needs.”24 The IRA was found not to be exempt under California
law because the debtor was not of retirement age and the debtor was
using the IRA for purposes other than retirement.25
C. In re Navarre
In re Navarre was decided in Alabama a year after Greenfield.26
The debtor in this case received a cash payout of his interest in his deceased mother’s IRA.27 Because Alabama opts out of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme, the court first had to analyze the issue of
whether IRAs are exempt under Alabama law.28 The court noted that
the debtor did not deposit his distributions “into an IRA account of his
own” and pointed out that the debtor could not have rolled over his
share of the inherited IRA into his own IRA account.29 The Navarre
court specifically referred to the Sims decision to emphasize that the
IRC distinguishes and treats IRAs and inherited IRAs differently.30 The
court ultimately held that an IRA interest inherited as a result of being
named a beneficiary of an IRA account was not sufficient to exempt
that interest under Alabama law.31
D. In re Taylor
An Illinois bankruptcy court in In re Taylor found that a debtor’s
interest in an inherited IRA was not exempt under the Illinois exemption statute.32 Although Illinois opts out of the federal exemption regime, the court noted that “[IRS] treatment of an IRA is the
determining factor” in deciding whether such an account is exempt.33
The Illinois exemption statute specifically exempts IRAs and other retirement vehicles that are “intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement plan” under the IRC.34 Similar to the Navarre court, the Taylor
court found that inherited IRAs are not exempt because they are
treated differently from regular IRAs under the IRC, namely, they are
“not exempt from being taxed as gross income”35 and once inherited,
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
Id.
In re Navarre, 332 B.R. 24 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2004).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
In re Taylor, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 755 (Bankr. C.D. III. May 9, 2006).
Id. at *5.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1006 (a)(i) (2007).
In re Taylor, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 755 at *5.
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the “beneficiary may make no contributions to the account”36 and cannot “roll over the inherited individual retirement account into another
retirement plan.”37 The court cited Navarre and Sims as two other cases
that reached the same conclusion.
E. In re Kirchen
The court in In re Kirchen acknowledged each of the previous cases
enumerated herein and noted that Wisconsin opts out of the federal exemption scheme; however, the court was quick to point out that rather
than spending time referring to other states’ exemption statutes, the issue of exemptions applying to inherited IRAs must “necessarily turn on
an examination of the language found in the Wisconsin exemption statute.”38 As the court noted, “the Debtor must have (1) an interest in
some type of retirement account; (2) providing benefits by reason of
age, illness, disability, death or length of service; that (3) complies with
the provisions of the [IRC].”39 Thus a retirement plan must comply
with the provisions of the IRC and must do so in the context of
retirement.
The debtor in Kirchen was the sole beneficiary of his mother’s IRA
and received annual distributions based upon his life expectancy. Despite the debtor’s argument to the contrary, the court found that the
contrast between being penalized for receiving distributions until reaching a certain age and being required to start taking distributions “without regard to age” meant that “the right to payments under an inherited
IRA are not on account of age.”40 As a result, the court found that the
inherited IRA did not comply with the provisions of the IRC as required by the Wisconsin exemption statute and as such, the IRA did
“not qualify for the Wisconsin exemption.”41
The Kirchen court was not only concerned that the inherited IRA
was not recognized under the IRC (or Wisconsin law) as a similar plan
“on account of age;” rather, the court also emphasized that the change
in status from an IRA to an inherited IRA meant that the IRA would
no longer receive preferential tax treatment under the IRC. A domino
effect resulted in that the loss of tax-deferral status caused the inherited
IRA to lose its status as a “retirement benefit” that complies with the
IRC, as required by the Wisconsin exemption statute.
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
In re Kirchen, 344 B.R. 908, 911 (Bankr. E.D. Wis 2006).
See WIS. STAT. § 815.18(3)(j)(2009).
In re Kirchen, 344 B.R. at 912 .
Id.
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F. In re Jarboe
In re Jarboe involved a debtor who claimed that the IRA he inherited from his deceased mother was exempt pursuant to Texas law.42 The
Texas exemption statute states that an IRA must “qualify under the applicable provisions” of the IRC before it will be exempt.43 The Jarboe
court recognized “a growing trend against allowing debtors to claim inherited IRAs as exempt from their. . .bankruptcy estates,” and stated
that those cases “do little to clarify whether an inherited IRA would be
exempt under Texas state law.”44 Instead, the court examined what is
meant by the term “qualify” under the IRC. According to the Fifth Circuit, “qualify. . .is a term of art” under the IRC and “retirement savings
plans must comply with [IRC] restrictions in order to be deemed ‘qualified.’”45 The court found that “the account must also satisfy the
hallmarks of an IRA.”46 The court interpreted the key hallmarks of an
IRA to be that the account meets the IRC requirements for exemption
and that it also operates as a retirement fund.
The Jarboe court found that the inherited IRA was not entitled to
exemption as a normal IRA would be because (i) it could not be rolled
over to another account, (ii) no contributions could be made to it, (iii)
all distributions must have been taken from the account within five
years or lifespan-measured withdrawals within one year, and (iv) distributions could be taken from it at any time and for any reason.47 Thus
the issue was not that the debtor actually withdrew money for reasons
other than retirement purposes; rather the court was concerned that the
debtor could do so without penalty.
G. In re McClelland
In re McClelland is the first case analyzed herein that held that an
inherited IRA is exempt from bankruptcy under state law in a state that
uses the federal exemption scheme.48 The Idaho bankruptcy court acknowledged how the issue had been resolved in previous cases but
noted that Idaho has a relatively broad exemption statute and that
Idaho also has a judicial tradition favoring the plain-meaning analysis of
statutes. The Idaho exemption statute exempts IRAs and “any other
right accrued or accruing to any citizen of the state of Idaho under any
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

In re Jarboe, 365 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
See TEX. PROP. CODE § 42.0021(2010).
In re Jarboe, 365 B.R. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
In re McClelland, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 41 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 7, 2008).
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employee benefit plan.”49 The bankruptcy trustee argued that the Idaho
legislature meant only to “protect retirement money earned and held by
the account owner” when it enacted its exemption statute, and that
there is no way to ensure that a beneficiary will save the inheritance for
retirement.50 The court rejected the Trustee’s argument finding that
the legislature did not “limit the scope of protection to retirement account owners only.”51 The court noted that it did not want to “substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature.”52 Therefore, despite the glut of
cases holding otherwise, McClelland was the first case that provided
some level of hope to debtors with inherited IRAs.
H. Robertson v. Deeb
In Robertson v. Deeb, the Florida appellate court found that despite a state law protecting retirement accounts, inherited IRAs are not
exempt from seizure by creditors.53 The court reasoned that an IRA can
be transformed into something different when the original account
owner dies and leaves it to an heir who converts the assets into his own
inherited IRA. The court cited various bankruptcy court rulings hinging
on public policy concerns that IRA accounts are exempt as they are
retirement savings but those same public policies did not extend to the
account holder’s heirs and beneficiaries.
While the decision turned on Florida law, the court drew much of
its reasoning from federal tax and bankruptcy law, even though the defendant was not in bankruptcy. Richard Robertson borrowed money
from Kevin Deeb and signed a promissory note. According to the opinion, Deeb sued Robertson for default and got a judgment exceeding
$180,000. Deeb discovered that Robertson had cash and securities inherited from his father in a bank custodial account entitled, “Richard A.
Robertson, Beneficiary, Harold Robertson Decedent Custodial IRA.”
Florida law provides that “money or other assets payable to an owner, a
participant or beneficiary” are exempt from “all claims of creditors” if
held in a “fund or account” maintained as an IRA exempt from taxation.54 The court held that the protection under Florida law applied only
to the original IRA account, and not to an inherited account, stating
that “the tax consequences of inherited IRAs render them completely
separate funds or accounts.”55
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.15.020 (2007).
In re McClelland, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *12.
Robertson v. Deeb, 16 So. 3d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
See FLA. STAT. § 221.21 (2007).
Robertson, 16 So. 3d at 938.
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The court specifically noted that original IRA owners can be penalized 10% for certain withdrawals before they turn 59 1/2, but federal tax
law allows heirs, regardless of age, to take immediate distributions from
inherited IRAs without paying the 10% penalty.56 Robertson may have
won had he chosen to retain the assets in the original IRA account.57
However, had he done so, he would have lost years of income tax deferral because the assets would have been mandatorily withdrawn (and
taxes paid on the withdrawals at ordinary income tax rates) within five
years. Robertson instead chose the inherited IRA option, which allows
an heir to stretch out withdrawals over his expected lifetime. The court
reasoned that moving the money to an inherited IRA account resulted
in the creation of a new unprotected account from creditors.58
I. In re Chilton
In In re Chilton, a debtor couple filed bankruptcy.59 Prior to the
filing, the wife’s mother had established an IRA that named the wife as
the designated beneficiary of the account. The mother died and the
wife established an IRA to receive funds from her mother’s IRA. The
account was titled “[Daughter], Beneficiary, [Mother], Decedent.” The
assets of the mother’s IRA were transferred directly to this account, and
the daughter contributed no funds to the account. The debtors claimed
the IRA as exempt from their creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(12).
Texas allows debtors to choose between state and federal exemptions.60 In Chilton, the debtors elected to use the federal exemption.
Accordingly, the Chilton court analyzed the federal exemption instead
of the state exemption. The court concluded that in viewing the words
“retirement funds” in their entire context, they cannot reasonably be
understood to authorize an exemption of an inherited IRA.61 The funds
contained in an inherited IRA are not funds intended for retirement
purposes but, instead, are distributed to the beneficiary of the account
without regard to age or retirement status.62 The Texas judge ruled that
inherited IRAs are not protected in bankruptcy because the funds in an
inherited IRA “are not funds intended for retirement purposes.”63 As
evidence of that, the judge pointed out that under IRS rules governing
56

Id. at 939.
The court emphasized that “inherited IRAs are not vehicles to defer taxation on
income in order to preserve money for retirement.” Id.
58 Id. at 939-40.
59 In re Chilton, 426 B.R. 612 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010).
60 See In re Jarboe, 365 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
61 In re Chilton, 426 B.R. at 618.
62 Id.
63 Id.
57
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inherited IRAs, the debtor wife, at 52 years old, would either have to
begin taking annual distributions from the IRA she inherited from her
mother in 2010, or deplete the entire IRA by 2013.64
J. In re Nessa
In re Nessa is an Eighth Circuit case out of Minnesota where the
debtor filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.65 Prior to that filing,
the debtor’s father had established an IRA pursuant to IRC § 408. The
debtor was named the beneficiary of that IRA. After her father died
and before filing her bankruptcy petition, the debtor made a trustee-totrustee transfer of the IRA to her own account; she did not “roll over”
the account to her own IRA nor did she take any distributions from her
father’s IRA. The debtor did not contribute any of her own funds to the
inherited account and any withdrawals would be taxable to her as ordinary income.
The debtor claimed the inherited account as exempt in her Schedule E, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12). The Trustee objected to the
debtor’s claim of an exemption for the inherited account. The bankruptcy court overruled the trustee’s objection to the debtor’s claimed
exemption. The court explained that the transfer of the contents of the
debtor’s father’s account to the inherited account was a trustee-to-trustee transfer as described in IRS Publication 590.66 The court concluded
that the funds transferred from the debtor’s father’s account retained
their character as retirement funds. Accordingly, it concluded that the
funds in the account qualified for an exemption under pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(12).67
Instead of looking subjectively at who contributed the funds to the
IRA and whether they were “retirement funds” of the debtor, the court
concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) merely requires that the account
be comprised of “retirement funds,” but not necessarily the debtor’s re64 Id. at 615. On March 16, 2011, a district court reversed the bankruptcy court in
Chilton and determined that the debtor’s inherited IRA met the requirements of the
bankruptcy exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12). Agreeing with the reasoning in In
re Nessa, 426 B.R. 312 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), aff’g, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 40
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2010), the district court concluded that the funds in a debtor’s inherited
IRA do not have to be the “retirement funds” of the debtor to satisfy the bankruptcy
exemption requirements. The court emphasized that 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(C) provides
that a direct transfer of funds from one account that is exempt under I.R.C. § 408 to
another such account does not make the funds ineligible for a bankruptcy exemption.
Chilton v. Moser, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-594 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Mar. 16, 2011).
65 In re Nessa, 426 B.R. 312.
66 I.R.S. Publ’n No. 590, 20 (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
p590.pdf.
67 In re Nessa, 426 B.R. at 314-15.
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tirement funds.”68 The other crucial factor is that an inherited IRA is
sheltered from tax under the same provisions as a regular IRA.69 The
court held that it is irrelevant that the debtor would have to take early
distributions since the exemption itself does not make an exception for
those situations.70
A key difference between the Nessa decision and the earlier Texas
and Florida decisions is that in Minnesota, bankruptcy debtors rely on
federal property exemptions rather than state exemptions. The bankruptcy trustee appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and the Court of Appeals affirmed the case holding that
an inherited IRA is still a retirement account protected under that law,
despite the fact that it has switched hands from the original owner to the
beneficiary.71
K. In re Klipsch
In re Klipsch is an Indiana bankruptcy case that was decided on
June 7, 2010.72 The debtor in Klipsch received a one-half interest in his
deceased father’s IRA and tried to convince the bankruptcy court that
his inherited IRA was exempt under the state exemption statute. Indiana is another opt-out state, so once again the decision of the court
turned on whether an inherited IRA is exempt under the relevant Indiana exemption statute.73 The court cited Chilton and Sims in determining that an inherited IRA is not exempt for purposes of the state
exemption statute and noted that “the public policy considerations
which support protecting debtor’s retirement savings do not extend to
inheritances.”74 Further, the court emphasized that “Indiana’s definition of retirement plan” directly correlates with the IRC’s “characterization of what is and what is not a retirement plan.”75 Because an
inherited IRA cannot be rolled over and is not a retirement plan, the
court held that inherited IRAs are not meant to be treated as retirement
plans under the IRC or Indiana law.76
68

Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
70 Id. (that “different rules regarding minimum required distributions” apply is
irrelevant).
71 Id.
72 In re Klipsch, 435 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010).
73 See IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2 (2010).
74 In re Klipsch, 435 B.R. at 589.
75 Id. at 588.
76 Id.
69

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\36-3\ACT304.txt

Winter 2010]

unknown

Seq: 15

12-APR-11

INHERITED IRAS

14:58

591

L. In re Tabor
In re Tabor is a bankruptcy court case for the middle district of
Pennsylvania and was decided June 18, 2010.77 The debtor selected both
the federal and state (Pennsylvania) exemption for IRAs. After acknowledging the tax differences between an inherited and regular IRA,
the court stated that the federal exemption only requires the funds to be
retirement funds, not the debtor’s retirement funds.78 The court also
found that the exemption for IRAs was the same whether the debtor
chose the federal or state exemption, and applied the Nessa court’s reasoning (which was based on the federal exemption) to hold that the inherited IRA was exempt.79
M. Case Matrix
A summary matrix of the cases discussed in this Part II is contained
in Exhibit C.
III. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AS AN ASSET PRODUCTION MECHANISM
A. Protection For Inherited IRAs Payable to Spendthrift Trusts
If an inherited IRA is not protected by the applicable state or federal exemption statute, it should still be possible to protect it if the IRA
is payable on death to a spendthrift trust, since in this case its protection
is based on the asset protection benefits of trust law. Common trust law
provides three separate types of asset protection: (a) discretionary trust
asset protection; (b) spendthrift protection; and (c) trusts where a distribution can only be for a specific purpose.80
B. Spendthrift Trust Overview
The spendthrift trust is a tool frequently employed by settlors seeking to protect beneficiaries of a trust from creditors’ claims. It is defined
as “a trust that prohibits the beneficiary’s interest from being assigned
and also prevents a creditor from attaching that interest; a trust by the
terms of which a valid restraint is imposed on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.”81 Such trusts “provide funds
for the beneficiary while at the same time protecting the beneficiary not
only from himself, but also from his creditors.”82
77

In re Tabor, 433 B.R. 469 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010).
Id. at 476.
79 Id.
80 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. a (2003) (discussing
differences from approach in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS).
81 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (8th ed. 2004).
82 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 94 (2005).
78
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While some states83 consider all express trusts to be spendthrift
trusts unless the settlor explicitly says otherwise, others will look for a
particular clause/provision within the trust document that will typically
contain language similar to the following:
No interest of any beneficiary hereto may be pledged, assigned, sold, or transferred in any manner, nor shall any beneficiary have the power to anticipate, charge, or encumber his
interest, either in income or principal, nor shall such interest of
any beneficiary be liable for or subject to the debts, contracts,
liabilities, engagements, or torts of such beneficiary.
Generally speaking, a term of the trust providing that the interest
of a beneficiary is held subject to a “spendthrift trust,” or words of similar import, is usually sufficient to restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.
Article Five of the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) addresses spendthrift trusts. Accordingly, that article has generated the most controversy among states that have considered the UTC (and the most interest
among estate planning attorneys). The comments to Article Five explain the purpose(s) and applicability of each subsection:
Section 501 applies if the trust does not contain a spendthrift
provision or the spendthrift provision, if any, does not apply to
the beneficiary’s interest. Section 502 states the effect of a
spendthrift provision. Unless a claim is being made by an exception creditor, a spendthrift provision bars a beneficiary’s
creditor from reaching the beneficiary’s interest until distribution is made by the trustee. An exception creditor, however,
can reach the beneficiary’s interest subject to the court’s power
to limit the relief. Section 503 lists the categories of exception
creditors whose claims are not subject to a spendthrift restriction. Sections 504 through 507 address special categories in
which the rights of a beneficiary’s creditors are the same
whether or not the trust contains a spendthrift provision.84
Increasingly, spendthrift trusts are coming under attack from creditors seeking to pierce their protections and attach a debtor beneficiary’s
income and/or distributions from such trusts. It is important to recognize the various pitfalls in drafting these trusts that can render the
spendthrift provision invalid, thereby exposing the beneficiary to creditors’ claims.
83 See PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING, STRATEGIES
FORMS ¶ 6.02[1] (2001).
84 UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 5 gen. cmt. (2005).

AND
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C. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
Simply put, where a settlor of a trust is also the beneficiary, a restraint on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest is invalid as against the beneficiary’s creditors.85 Thus, if the
settlor is entitled to receive a distribution of income from the trust, a
creditor will be successful in reaching such income distributions. However, if properly structured, a self-settled trust may be able to protect its
remaining corpus, theoretically for the benefit of future contingent beneficiaries of the domestic trust.
The general rule is that a party may not create a trust for his own
benefit, transfer property into it, and then rely upon a spendthrift clause
to protect the property from his creditors.86 It should be noted that exceptions do exist in various states that permit self-settled spendthrift
trusts, such as Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
and Wyoming.87 Furthermore, some courts have held that where only
part of the trust is self-settled (and the other part is not), then only the
self-settled portion may be reached by creditors.88
D. Distributions For Actual Needs
In many situations, the settlor will desire to create a spendthrift
trust wherein the beneficiary, who is also the trustee, has the right to
distribute income and principal to himself only in accordance with his
actual needs for health care, support and education. Whether or not this
trust will be exempt from creditors will depend largely on the degree of
discretion afforded to the beneficiary/trustee.
85 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58(2) (2003)
86 See, e.g., In re Mack, 269 B.R. 392 (Bankr. Minn. 2001); In re Spenlinhauer, 182
B.R. 361 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995); Markmueller v. Case, 51 F.3d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1995)
(applying Missouri law, interest in self-settled trust was included in bankruptcy estate); In
re Hartman, 115 B.R. 171 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (a person may not establish a trust
under which he is to receive income as a beneficiary, while at the same time attempting to
protect the trust assets from his creditors by the simple inclusion of a spendthrift clause);
Williams v. Threet, 118 B.R. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (under Oklahoma law, a selfsettled trust cannot be spendthrift); Bank of Dallas v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 540
S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (creditors were allowed to reach the debtor’s interest in a spendthrift trust where he was one of 2 settlors and one of 3 beneficiaries); Ware
v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1954).
87 See PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING, STRATEGIES AND
FORMS ¶ 6.10 (2010) (analyzing all of those statutes except the Hawaii statute); HAWAII
REV. STAT.§ 554G (2010) (“Permitted Transfers in Trust”), .
88 See In re Tait, 2008 WL 4183341 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2008).
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If the trust gives the beneficiary authority to define his own “actual
needs,” such that the beneficiary receives distributions in discretionary
amounts and intervals, creditors of the beneficiary are entitled to receive or attach any distributions he makes.89 Whenever a beneficiary
has authority to determine his own benefits, creditors are able to reach
the maximum amount the trustee/beneficiary can properly take from
time to time—regardless of whether the express or implied purposes of
the discretionary distributions are to provide for the beneficiary’s support, health care, or education.90
However, the amount a creditor can reach may wind up being limited to provide for those same “actual needs;” the court may reserve a
portion of that amount for the beneficiary’s actual needs for reasonable
support, health care, and education.91 Obviously the court might have a
much different definition of such needs than the beneficiary himself!
In the bankruptcy case of In re McCoy,92 the debtor in bankruptcy
was the sole trustee of a family trust established upon the death of his
wife. He was also the beneficiary. The trust was established pursuant to
the last will and testament of Mrs. McCoy. Although the will did not
give the debtor any express power of appointment of trust assets (nor
the express right to revoke or amend the trust), it did give him discretion to spend trust assets—specifically, he held the power to make distributions for “health, maintenance and support” in such amounts as might
be “required or desirable.”93 It is the use of the words “required or desirable,” which the court found fatal.94 The court held that, when taken
as a whole, the terms of the trust were such that the debtor, in his capacity as trustee, could make payments to himself from the corpus to any
extent that he alone determined “desirable.”95 Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation was that the settlor intended the debtor/beneficiary, as sole trustee, to have unfettered dominion and control over the
trust—regardless of the presence of the usual “health, maintenance and
support” language. As such, the assets of the trust were includable in the
assets of the bankruptcy estate available to pay creditor claims.96
Therefore, if the beneficiary of a trust is also the sole trustee, and
the trustee powers include the ability to make distributions for the beneficiary-trustee’s own actual needs (health care, maintenance, education,
and support), then the only conceivable way to maintain spendthrift
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (2003).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. g (2003).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. c (2003).
274 B.R. 751 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Id. at 755.
Id. at 763-66.
Id. at 766.
Id.
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protection and avoid creditor attachment is to remove all discretionary
power with respect to both timing and amounts. As discussed in Part
III.G, the creditors of the beneficiary-trustee generally cannot reach assets that may be distributed only to the beneficiary under an ascertainable standard.
E. General Powers of Appointment
As a general rule, where: (1) an individual is both trustee and beneficiary of a trust, (2) the trust grants that individual a general power of
appointment, and (3) the individual exercises that power of appointment, then the property appointed is deemed to be part of the individual’s assets and therefore reachable by creditors.97 However, creditors
of the holder of an unexercised general power of appointment created
by another cannot acquire the power or compel its exercise unless authorized by statute.98
In cases where a general power of appointment is granted by the
settlor, but not exercised by the trustee/beneficiary, the courts are split
as to whether the underlying trust may be considered a true “spendthrift
trust.”99
In In re Gilroy,100 the court applied Illinois state law to a case in
which the debtor was both sole trustee and sole beneficiary of the
trust.101 In claiming that the spendthrift provision was nevertheless
valid, the debtor pointed out that the trust imposed severe limitations
on her discretion as trustee. However, the trust also gave her a general
97 See, e.g., In re Strehlow, 84 B.R. 241 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (trust beneficiary
who was also co-trustee exercised sufficient control over trust assets such that the trust
did not qualify as a “spendthrift trust”); In re Breault’s Estate, 211 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App.
1965) (citing Illinois rule that “where a person has a general power of appointment, and
exercises that power, the property appointed is deemed, in equity, part of his assets, so
far as his creditors are concerned, and subject to their demands”); State Street Trust Co.
v. Kissel, 19 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. 1939) (“if a party may appoint property to himself or
others, and he exercises the power in favor of others, the property so appointed becomes
available to his creditors notwithstanding his contrary direction through the power’s exercise or the presence of a spendthrift clause covering his own beneficial interest in the
underlying trust”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.4 (1986) (exercise of general power by will subjects property to holder’s creditors); id. § 13.5 (1986)
(exercise of general power by deed subjects property to holder’s creditors if exercise
constitutes fraudulent transfer).
98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 13.6(1) (1983).
99 Compare In re Gilroy, 235 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (spendthrift clause
invalid even though beneficiary had not exercised general power of appointment) with In
re CRS Steam, Inc., 217 B.R. 365 (Bankr. Mass. 1998) (spendthrift clause valid where
beneficiary had not exercised general power of appointment).
100 235 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
101 Id. at 516.
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power of appointment. The Gilroy court held that by virtue of the settlor having given the beneficiary this general power of appointment, it
was clear that he did not intend to create a true spendthrift trust.
Rather, “he intended to restrict the access of creditors to the res without
also restricting the beneficiaries’ own access to it.”102 The court deemed
the spendthrift clause to be invalid and unenforceable, despite the fact
that the debtor had not exercised the power of appointment.103
In Univ. Nat. Bank v. Rhoadarmer,104 the trustee/beneficiary of a
trust held a similar power of appointment, and similarly did not exercise
her power to appoint a portion of the trust corpus to herself or to anyone else. The bank argued that the fact that the trustee/beneficiary had
not exercised her power to receive funds was immaterial, and that once
a beneficiary has the right to income or principal, that income or principal essentially belongs to the beneficiary and is reachable by creditors.105 Unlike the court in Gilroy, the court in Rhoadarmer relied upon
the “common law principle that property subject to a donee’s general
power of appointment is available to his creditors only if the power is
exercised.”106 Because the trustee/beneficiary:
has not exercised her power of appointment and because the
trial court may not, in effect, exercise it in her stead, she possesses no garnishable interest in assets which remain the property of the Trust. Further, the spendthrift provision here
prevents invasion of Trust property for the benefit of her
creditors.107
In In re CRS Steam, Inc.,108 the debtor again held a general power
of appointment. The question addressed by the court was whether or
not the debtor’s general power of appointment made the trust assets
available to his creditors under state law, notwithstanding the spendthrift clause. The court acknowledged that:
if a party may appoint property to himself or others, and he
exercises the power in favor of others, the property so ap102

Id. at 517.
Id. at 518. The debtor in Gilroy also argued that under Illinois law, a creditor
cannot compel the exercise of a power of appointment. The court acknowledged this
argument without deciding the issue, reasoning that the spendthrift provision would be
deemed invalid anyway, since the debtor had “unfettered control” over the trust corpus.
104 827 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991).
105 See Brent v. State of Md. Cent. Collection Unit, 537 A.2d 227 (Md. 1988); First
Nat. Bank of Omaha v. First Cadco Corp., 205 N.W.2d 115 (Neb. 1973).
106 Univ. Nat. Bank v. Rhoadarmer, 827 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991) (citing NANCY,
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 233 (1977)); 18 A.L.R. 1470 (1922).
107 Rhoadarmer, 827 P.2d at 564.
108 217 B.R. 365 (Bankr. Mass. 1998).
103
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pointed becomes available to his creditors notwithstanding his
contrary direction through the power’s exercise or the presence of a spendthrift clause covering his own beneficial interest
in the underlying trust.109
However, since the debtor in this case had not exercised his power,
the court adopted the Restatement’s position that “creditors of the
holder of an unexercised general power created by another cannot acquire the power or compel its exercise, except as provided by statute.”110 As there was no authorizing state statute, the bankruptcy court
applied an analogous state court decision and concluded that the Massachusetts Supreme Court would not have permitted the debtor’s creditors
“to reach its property or compel the debtor to exercise his general
power of appointment in their favor.”111
F. Control Over Distribution of the Trust Corpus
Aside from a general power of appointment, a beneficiary’s control
over (or access to) the trust corpus is another characteristic that will
likely invalidate a spendthrift trust. Various courts have articulated the
same basic principle: that the ability of a beneficiary to force distribution of the trust corpus is contrary to the nature of a spendthrift trust.112
This makes sense, as one of the key purposes of a spendthrift trust is to
protect the beneficiary from herself – that is, her perceived inability to
manage her own funds.
Typically, a debtor seeking to protect an inherited IRA by way of a
spendthrift trust must show that she does not possess “exclusive and
effective control over distribution.”113 In deciding whether a trust is a
valid spendthrift trust, the court will consider the extent to which the
trust agreement allows the beneficiary to control the plan’s assets. Essentially, the court will look for an ascertainable standard somewhere in
the trust document that limits the beneficiary’s power to invade the
109 Id. at 372 (citing State Street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 19 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. 1939));
Shattuck v. Burrage, 118 N.E. 889 (Mass. 1918); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 13.4 (1986) (exercise of general power by will subjects property to holder’s creditors);
Id. § 13.5 (1986) (exercise of general power by deed subjects property to holder’s creditors if exercise constitutes fraudulent transfer).
110 In re CRS Steam, 217 B.R. at 372 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 13.6(1)).
111 Id. at 372.
112 See, e.g., In re Groves, 120 B.R. 956 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Gilroy, 235 B.R.
512 (Bankr. Mass. 1999) (spendthrift trust invalid because the beneficiary had unrestricted access to the trust corpus and could freely invade the trust).
113 In re Peterson, 88 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988). See also In re Dagnall, 78 B.R.
531 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (debtor had to show that he did not possess exclusive and
effective control over distribution of trust corpus).
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corpus.114 In order to be considered a true spendthrift trust, there must
not be any “possible voluntary action a beneficiary can take which
would initiate an early termination of the trust or invasion of the
corpus.”115
G. Creditors Reach of Beneficiary’s Interest Before Distribution
As long as property is held in trust and is subject to the terms of a
spendthrift provision, the general rule is that property may not be
reached by the creditors of a beneficiary of that trust.116 However, all
property of a debtor (except property that is otherwise legally exempt)
can eventually, in proper time and manner, be reached by his creditors.
Accordingly, once the proceeds of a trust are distributed to the beneficiaries, they fall outside the protection of the spendthrift clause and may
be reached by creditors.
Typically, a creditor of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may not
reach the beneficiary’s interest, or a distribution by the trustee, before
its receipt by the beneficiary.117 The existence of a valid spendthrift provision bars a beneficiary’s creditor from reaching the beneficiary’s interest until distribution is made by the trustee.118 An exception creditor,
however, can reach the beneficiary’s interest prior to distribution.119 A
creditor seeking to do this must fall within one of the exceptions categorized in UTC section 503, and any relief obtained in this manner will be
subject to the court’s power to limit the relief (such as allowing for “actual needs”, as explored above).120
In addition to section 503 “exception creditors,” the IRS will also
likely be able to levy against a beneficiary’s interest prior to receipt,
irrespective of whether the trust contains a spendthrift provision. For
example, in Leuschner v. First Western Bank & Trust, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed that a taxpayer’s interest in a trust could be reached by a federal tax lien, observing that “there is no doubt that the paramount right
to collect taxes of the federal government overrides a state’s statute providing for exemptions.”121 Thus, the spendthrift provision of a trust,
however effective against certain creditors’ claims, is ineffective at insu114 See Forsee v. U.S., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Kan. 1999) (spendthrift provision in
the trust agreement did not sufficiently limit the debtor’s power to spend money from the
trust corpus for his own happiness as a beneficiary).
115 In re Groves, 120 B.R. 956 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 1990).
116 See Part III.B.
117 UNIF. TRUST CODE, § 502(c) (2005).
118 Booth v. Booth, 134 P.3d 1151, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), (citing UNIF. TRUST
CODE §§ 501-507 (2005)).
119 Id.
120 See Part III.D.
121 Leuschner v. First Western Bank & Trust, 261 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir. 1958).
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lating assets of the trust from levy by the IRS, provided that such assets
are first found to constitute the “property” or “right to property” of the
taxpayer.122
As you might expect, the restrictions/limitations on a creditor’s
ability to go directly to the trustee to satisfy the beneficiary’s debts depends largely on the beneficiary’s control over the trust corpus. A creditor cannot compel a trustee to make discretionary distributions to the
beneficiary (which the creditor could subsequently attach) if the beneficiary himself could not do so.123 That is, regardless of whether or not
the trust contains a spendthrift provision, a creditor of a beneficiary may
not compel a distribution subject to the trustee’s discretion, even if the
“discretion” is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution.124
Keep in mind that a court can force a beneficiary to exercise any
power that the beneficiary may have with respect to the trust.125 Therefore, it is crucial that the beneficiary be given little or no unilateral, discretionary rights to control any aspect of the trust. To the extent that
such control is granted, the beneficiary of the trust can be forced to
exercise those powers in order to satisfy his debts to his creditors.126
Obviously this becomes more complicated if the trustee and the
beneficiary are one and the same. Section 504 of the UTC addresses
this scenario, and says that the beneficiary/trustee is protected from
creditor claims to the extent that his discretionary powers are governed
by an ascertainable standard (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code).
Specifically, section 504(e) provides:
If the trustee’s or co-trustee’s discretion to make distributions
for the trustee’s or co-trustee’s own benefit is limited by an
ascertainable standard, a creditor may not reach or compel distribution of the beneficial interest except to the extent the interest would be subject to the creditor’s claim were the
beneficiary not acting as trustee or co-trustee.127
The result, of course, is that the beneficiary/trustee’s interest is protected from creditors to the same extent that it is also exempt from federal estate tax.128
122

Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. e (2003).
124 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. e, illus. 5 (2003).
125 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. g (2003).
126 Failure of a debtor to comply with a court’s order in this regard can subject him to
a “contempt of court” action. See, e.g. In re Coker, 251 B.R. 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
127 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(4).
128 A beneficiary’s distribution authority that “is limited by an ascertainable standard
relating to the health, education, support or maintenance of the decedent shall not be
123
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Finally, UTC section 506(b) addresses issues of timely distributions
of required minimum distributions from retirement plans and IRAs that
apply regardless of whether a trust contains a spendthrift provision, or
whether the trustee is also a beneficiary. In every case, a creditor of a
beneficiary may reach a mandatory distribution of income or principal if
the trustee has not made the distribution to the beneficiary within a reasonable time after the designated distribution date.129 This reaffirms the
fact that creditors cannot generally pierce the trust, compel distributions, and/or attach all required payments as soon as (or before) they
become due. Instead, the creditor must first wait “a reasonable period
of time”;130 following this reasonable period, payments mandated by the
express terms of the trust are considered to be “held by the trustee as
agent for the beneficiary,” and can therefore be treated as part of the his
personal assets.131
H. Discretionary Trust as Beneficiary of a Rollover IRA
If a decedent dies owning an IRA and designates as the beneficiary
of the IRA an irrevocable trust (or subtrust), containing spendthrift provisions, and the trust provides that distributions to the beneficiary are in
the discretion of an independent trustee, the beneficiary’s interest in the
trust is limited and as such there is no property right that a creditor can
attach.132
I. Can a Trusteed IRA Provide Spendthrift Protection?
IRC 408(a) defines an IRA as a “trust. . .for the exclusive benefit of
an individual or his beneficiaries.” Under IRC § 408(h), a custodial account may be treated as an IRA for purposes of IRC § 408. Virtually all
commercially marketed IRA accounts are custodial IRAs, but there are
some IRA providers that will accept a trusteed IRA. If the trusteed
IRA contains a spendthrift clause, prohibiting the beneficiary from
alienating the IRA benefits and stating that the beneficiary’s interest in
the trust shall not be subject to any legal process by a beneficiary’s creditors, this would seem to allow for protection under the spendthrift trust
exemption. If the beneficiary who inherits the IRA has the same powdeemed a general power of appointment” and does not cause estate inclusion in the beneficiary’s gross estate. INT. REV. CODE § 2041(b)(1)(A).
129 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 506(b) (2005).
130 Id.
131 Id. cmt.
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS §58 (2003). Note, however, that §§ 50, 59 and 60 of the Third Restatement of
Trusts provide exceptions to this provision.
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ers of the account owner to withdraw the assets, however, it is unlikely a
spendthrift clause would provide any protection to the beneficiary.133
IV. MAKING THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST A
DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY
A. Maximizing the Tax-Deferred Growth
It is axiomatic that assets distributed from a spendthrift trust can be
reached by the beneficiary’s creditors. So, while paying an IRA to a
spendthrift trust after the owner’s death may be preferable to paying it
to the beneficiary outright, that is only part of the solution. If the
spendthrift trust requires the beneficiary to receive certain, potentially
sizeable, distributions, some part of the assets in the IRA is exposed to
the beneficiary’s creditors every year.
Further, if the spendthrift trust is not a “designated beneficiary,”
creditor protection may be achieved only at the expense of an unfavorable income tax result.134 Harmonizing good trust planning with planning intended to preserve retirement account income tax deferral
benefits can be difficult.
In order to maximize tax-deferred growth within the account and to
avoid the five-year liquidation rule, it is very important to have a qualified designated beneficiary. If a trust has been named beneficiary of a
retirement account, it must meet all the requirements of Treasury Regulation section 1.401(a)(9)-4 A-5 to constitute a qualified designated beneficiary. An IRA trust should also follow guidelines set forth in Private
Letter Rulings that have been issued by the IRS in order to qualify as a
designated beneficiary. While Private Letter Rulings are not binding on
taxpayers other than those who requested the ruling, they are indicative
of how the Service will rule in similar situations involving a trust as designated beneficiary. If a retirement account is made payable to a nonqualifying trust, a tremendous amount of tax-deferred growth will be
lost.135

133

See Part III.F.
If there is no “designated beneficiary” as described in Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4,
there may be much less ability to defer withdrawals from the retirement account than if
there is a designated beneficiary. For example, if an owner dies before the “required
beginning date” for distributions, the entire account must be distributed within five years
if there is no designated beneficiary. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(ii).
135 See e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-3, A-4(a)(2) (“5-year rule”).
134
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B. Conduit Trust
1. The Basics
A “conduit trust” in its most basic form requires the annual
payment of all distributions from the retirement plan or IRA,
including the post-mortem minimum required distribution
(“MRD”) amount, to the current named trust beneficiary.136
No part of the MRD amount can ever be accumulated in the
trust for subsequent distributions to other beneficiaries.137
When there is a designated beneficiary of a retirement plan or
IRA, the life expectancy of the beneficiary receiving the
MRDs can generally be used to determine the amounts of the
distributions, and the oldest beneficiary of a conduit trust that
is receiving the distributions is treated as the designated beneficiary.138 One of the most common drafting mistakes that
causes trusts not to be designated beneficiaries is having nonindividual or non-ascertainable remote contingent beneficiaries.139 By drafting the trust as a conduit trust, contingent
beneficiaries do not have to be considered in determining who
is the oldest potential beneficiary of the trust.140
2. Advantages
(a) If the beneficiary is young, MRDs are likely to be very small at
first.141
(b) Older, non-individual and unascertainable beneficiaries can be
disregarded for purposes of determining which trust beneficiaries have
to be taken into account.142
(c) The beneficiary can be given a non-general power of appointment potentially exercisable in favor of older or non-individual beneficiaries without affecting the MRD amount payable to him or her.143
136 See Alvin J. Golden, It Should Not Be This Hard: A Look at Trusts as Beneficiaries of Retirement Benefits, 36 ACTEC L.J. 399, 405 (2010)[hereinafter Golden, Trusts
as Beneficiaries].
137 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7(c)(3), Example 2.
138 See Golden, Trusts and Beneficiaries, supra note 136, at 405.
139 See id. at 407-409.
140 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7(c)(3), Example 2 (residuary successor trust
beneficiaries “are mere potential successors to B’s interest”) .
141 Amounts paid over the life expectancy of a young individual will be paid over a
long period of time and therefore will be relatively small.
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7(c)(3), Example 2
143 If the trust is not a conduit trust and if a special power of appointment could be
exercised in favor of older individuals than the current beneficiary, the life expectancy of
those older potential beneficiaries would have to used in determining required minimum
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(d) The beneficiary can be given a “tax arbitrage” general power of
appointment to minimize generation-skipping tax without affecting the
MRD amount payable to him or her.144
(e) Payment of the MRD will pull out trust Distributable Net Income (“DNI”); this, in turn, minimizes the amount of income taxed to
the trust (which reaches the highest 35% federal income tax bracket at
$11,350 of income in 2011) and maximizes the amount of income taxable
to the beneficiary (with an unmarried beneficiary reaching the highest
bracket at $379,150 of taxable income).145
(f) If other assets held in trust for the beneficiary are locked in a
wholly-discretionary trust, a conduit trust requiring payments can make
the overall situation more palatable to the beneficiary.146
(g) The beneficiary cannot direct where un-withdrawn amounts, if
any, will go at his or her death; instead, these amounts will (unless the
beneficiary has a testamentary power of appointment) be paid to the
successor beneficiaries named in the trust agreement.
(h) The beneficiary cannot unilaterally cash out of the IRA,
thereby bypassing the “stretch” features the IRA owner’s advisors were
so careful to preserve.
(i) The trustee has a fiduciary duty to prudently invest the IRA
assets; the beneficiary himself or herself may lack the aptitude or desire.
3. Disadvantages
(a) Amounts distributed as post-mortem MRDs can be reached by
the beneficiary’s creditors after payment
(b) Post-mortem MRDs increase annually, thereby exposing increasing amounts to the beneficiary’s creditors. Payments to older beneficiaries may represent a significant portion of the IRA.
(c) If the beneficiary lives to his or her life expectancy under the
IRS tables, he or she will have received all of the IRA; there will be
nothing left for the remainder beneficiaries and the unspent MRDs will
distributions. See e.g., PLR 200235038 (power of appointment could be exercised only in
favor of younger individuals; the current beneficiary “has a life expectancy that is shorter
than that of another other potential beneficiary” and that person’s life expectancy must
be used for determining the distribution period).
144 See NATALIE CHOATE, LIFE AND DEATH PLANNING FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS
321 (6th ed. 2006) (because remainder beneficiaries are disregarded in determining the
individual designated beneficiary, the beneficiary could have the power to appoint trust
assets to anyone, including an estate or older individual).
145 Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297 (§2.01 Tables 3 and 5).
146 If the conduit trust features only impact IRA MRDs and does not impact other
assts in the trust, a conduit trust is often preferable to an accumulation trust, described in
Part IV.D, because there is no problem with using powers of appointment that could be
exercised in favor of older or non-individual beneficiaries.
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be included in the beneficiary’s estate for estate tax purposes. An IRA
paid to a conduit trust is not a good “legacy asset.”
(d) To the extent not spent, payments received by the beneficiary
are subject to the beneficiary’s own estate planning documents and may
pass outside of the IRA owner’s family.
C. Conduit Trusts Outside the Box
1. Payments “For the Benefit of” The Beneficiary
Suppose the trust agreement contains provisions authorizing the
trustee to make payments for the benefit of the beneficiary. If the trustee exercises this discretion and pays the annual MRD not to the beneficiary, but, instead, directly to the providers of services to the
beneficiary, will the trust be treated as a conduit trust? There does not
appear to be any reliable guidance on this point from the IRS. In the
context of the estate tax marital deduction, payments from a Qualified
Terminable Interest Property (“QTIP”) trust for the benefit of a surviving spouse will not cause the trust to flunk the “all income to surviving
spouse for life” requirement of IRC §§ 2056(b)(5) and 2056(b)(7).147
The analogy of a QTIP trust to a conduit trust in this regard may not be
dispositive, since the result in the QTIP context is a function of Treasury
Regulations, which do not appear to directly address this point for retirement plans.
2. The Sprinkle Conduit Trust
Assume the beneficiary has children. Suppose the trust provides
that the trustee must withdraw the annual postmortem MRD amount,
based on the beneficiary’s age, and pay that amount out of the trust, but
that the trustee can sprinkle the distributable amount among the beneficiary and her children. The trust should be treated as a conduit trust,
even if the trustee decides to pay all of the MRD among the beneficiary’s children in any given year.148 Payments to the beneficiary’s children allow the trustee to avoid exposing those payments to the
beneficiary’s creditors. Such payments may also confer an indirect financial benefit on the beneficiary.
3. Payments to an UTMA Account
The trust grantor is typically concerned about payments to young
beneficiaries. Payments to a Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
(“UTMA”) account for a beneficiary under 21 years of age should be
147

See Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f)(4); Rev. Rul. 85-35, 1985-1 C.B. 328.
See SEBASTIAN V. GRASSI, JR., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
FAMILY WITH A SPECIAL NEEDS CHILD, 179 (2009).
148

A

FOR
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treated as payment to the beneficiary himself or herself, because the
minor is the owner of the UTMA account for federal tax and state law
purposes.149 The UTMA account should not be treated as somehow
being a trust with the minor as the current beneficiary and the minor’s
heirs-at-law (who will often be the minor’s parents) as the remainder
beneficiaries.
4. Banking the MRDs
Suppose the trust agreement gives the trustee the discretion in any
year to refrain from paying the annual MRD to the beneficiary, and
directs that the unpaid MRD is to be held in a separate account, the
proceeds and increases of which are to be distributed to the beneficiary
when he reaches, say, age 35. Thereafter, the trust is a traditional conduit trust as to the beneficiary. Will this trust be treated as a conduit
trust? The beneficiary will receive all of the MRDs; he just will not
receive them on an annual basis. What if the beneficiary dies before age
35? If the trust agreement provides that the accumulated funds pass to
older beneficiaries, it is likely that these beneficiaries will have to be
considered in determining the amount of post-mortem MRDs. If the
trust agreement provides that the accumulated funds are paid to the
beneficiary’s estate if he dies before age 35 it is likely the estate will
deprive the trust of its status as a designated beneficiary. It is not safe to
assume anything other than that MRDs must be paid on a current basis
for the trust to be treated as a conduit trust.
5. Use an “Individual Retirement Trust” Instead?
Some IRA providers offer an “individual retirement trust,” or
“IRT,” option. MRDs cannot be accumulated in an IRT, and must instead be paid annually. In theory, the IRA owner can, within the confines of the trust agreement, deny the beneficiary access to the IRA
corpus after the owner’s death so long as the beneficiary always receives
the minimum required distribution. Likewise, again within the confines
of what the IRA provider will permit, the provider-trustee can have the
discretion to distribute amounts greater than the MRD to the beneficiary for his health, maintenance and support. Assuming provider cooperation, the owner could theoretically also limit the ability of the
beneficiary to name successor beneficiaries within a particular class,
thus keeping the funds in the family blood line. The issue is whether the
IRT will be treated for creditor protection purposes as a third-party
149 See Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212 (income of custodial account taxed directly
to minor for federal income tax purposes and transfer to account is a completed gift that
qualifies for gift tax annual exclusion); Rev. Rul. 73-287, 1973-2 C.B. 321.
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spendthrift trust or, instead, as an inherited IRA. If the IRT agreement
contains a spendthrift provision, imposes fiduciary duties upon the IRT
trustee, and prohibits the beneficiary from reducing the corpus of the
IRA to possession upon demand, the arrangement certainly has the look
and feel of a spendthrift trust. The analysis will likely need to be on a
case-by-case basis, and the result will likely be a function of the IRT
agreement and the particulars of the owner’s beneficiary designation.
D. Accumulation Trust
1. The Basics
An “accumulation trust” in its most basic form is a trust that does
not require current distributions of the MRD to the trust beneficiaries
but that is for the benefit of one or more individual beneficiaries the life
expectancy of the eldest of whom can be used to determine MRDs. Instead, if the trust agreement permits, the trustee can accumulate all or a
part of the MRD paid into the trust for eventual payment to any one or
more of the eldest beneficiary and other beneficiaries named in the trust
agreement.150
2. Advantages
(j) The trustee can have a wide range of discretion to pay or not
pay amounts withdrawn from the IRA by the trustee.151 The trustee can
accumulate IRA funds inside the trust and avoid exposing those funds
to creditors.
(k) IRA assets can be preserved inside the trust for eventual distribution to remainder beneficiaries. The trust assets will not be included
in the beneficiary’s estate for federal estate tax purposes.152
(l) The beneficiary cannot direct where un-withdrawn amounts, if
any, will go at his or her death; instead, these amounts will be paid to
the successor beneficiaries named in the trust agreement (unless the settler wishes to grant the beneficiary a non-general power of
appointment).
(m) The beneficiary cannot unilaterally cash out of the IRA.
(n) The trustee has a fiduciary duty to invest prudently the IRA
assets; the beneficiary may lack the aptitude or desire.
150 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, A-5(b) (listing the following requirements of
“see-through” trusts: valid trust under state law; irrevocable trust; identifiable beneficiaries, and a class of beneficiaries must be identifiable from the trust and not by operation of law; and specified documentation that has been filed with the plan administrator).
151 Golden, Trusts and Beneficiaries, supra note 136, at 407-409.
152 The assets would not be included in the beneficiary’s gross estate as long as the
beneficiary does not hold a general power of appointment over the trust. INT. REV.
CODE § 2041.
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3. Disadvantages
(o) Older, non-individual and unascertainable beneficiaries cannot
be disregarded for purposes of determining which trust beneficiaries
have to be taken into account.153 The presence of such persons may
increase the amount of the post-mortem MRD.
(p) The beneficiary cannot be given a non-general power of appointment potentially exercisable in favor of older or non-individual
beneficiaries without increasing the MRD amount payable to the beneficiary.154 On the other hand, the IRS has privately ruled on several
occasions that a power of appointment exercisable only in favor of persons younger than the beneficiary does not disqualify the holder of the
power as a designated beneficiary.155
(q) The beneficiary cannot be given a “tax arbitrage” general
power of appointment to minimize generation-skipping tax. Such a
power could cause the trust not to have a designated beneficiary.156
(r) To the extent that an MRD received by the trustee is taxable as
ordinary income to the trust and is not paid out to any beneficiary, the
unpaid portion is subject to federal income tax by the trust. Trusts reach
the highest 35% federal income tax bracket on ordinary income of
$11,350 in 2011.157 Payment of state and federal income taxes could
significantly erode the benefit of the IRA to the beneficiaries, especially
if the IRA is the only asset of the trust and the only source of funds to
pay income taxes.
E. PLR 200537044 Toggle Trust
In Private Letter Ruling 200537044,158 the taxpayer created a trust
that, in turn, created nine separate sub-trusts under the master trust
agreement. The taxpayer executed a beneficiary designation form naming the nine separate sub-trusts as primary beneficiaries of the IRA,
each sub-trust to receive a specified percentage of the entire IRA. Each
153 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7 (“designated beneficiary with the shortest life
expectancy”)
154 If the power can be exercised in favor of older individuals, the oldest possible
appointee’s life expectancy would be used to determine the MRD, which would result in
larger MRD amounts.
155 PLR 200235038; 199903050 (January 25, 1999) (power to appoint to issue of participant and her husband).
156 Golden, Trusts and Beneficiaries, supra note 136, at 405 if the beneficiary has a
general power of appointment, there is no designated beneficiary “because the oldest
beneficiary cannot be identified”).
157 Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297 (§2.01 Table 3).
158 PLR 200537044 (Sep. 16, 2005).
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of the sub-trusts was specified in the trust agreement as a separate share
trust.
Each of the nine separate sub-trusts was structured as a conduit
trust. However, the trust agreement appointed an independent thirdparty as a Trust Protector, who was given the power to transform any
conduit sub-trust into an accumulation trust. The trust agreement also
gave the Trust Protector the ability to convert an accumulation trust to a
conduit trust. If the Trust Protector exercised his power to convert a
conduit trust to an accumulation trust, the Trust Protector also had the
power to eliminate contingent beneficiaries who were older than the single beneficiary of the sub-trust, and to restrict the beneficiary’s power to
appoint the trust assets to non-individuals, or individuals older than the
single beneficiary. The effect of any action of the Trust Protector to
eliminate non-individual beneficiaries and older individual beneficiaries
was, under the terms of the trust agreement, to make the interests of
such beneficiaries void ab initio.
Within nine months of the decedent’s death, and before September
30 of the year after the year in which the IRA owner died, the Trust
Protector exercised its power to convert one of the trusts from a conduit
trust to an accumulation trust. The Trust Protector also limited the
identity of permissible appointees and takers in default of exercise to
individual beneficiaries younger than the beneficiary.
The taxpayer represented that the exercise of the Trust Protector’s
powers was a disclaimer under applicable state law. The IRS ruled that
the converted trust could stretch distributions out over the life expectancy of the beneficiary of the now-accumulation trust.
How useful is this kind of toggle trust? In the PLR, the Trust Protector switched from a conduit trust to an accumulation trust before the
September 30 determination date. There may well be circumstances
where the Trust Protector would have information that would lead him
or her to toggle into an accumulation trust for creditor protection reasons soon after the IRA owner’s death. Similarly, the ability to toggle
into an accumulation trust if the beneficiary later had creditor problems
could be helpful for creditor protection reasons, but will this type of
trust work if the toggle is flipped after the determination date?
If the IRS treats the exercise of the Trust Protector’s power as a
disclaimer for state law purposes (and the PLR appears to state that the
IRS so treated the exercise of the power as a disclaimer only at the
request of the taxpayer), then the Trust Protector’s acts could be timebarred under the disclaimer statutes of many states. However, many
states, including Florida, have adopted a form of the Uniform Dis-
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claimer of Property Interests Act (“UDPIA”).159 Under the UDPIA
there is no time limit for disclaimers.160 In any case, it is hard to see
how the exercise of the Trust Protector’s power could be a disclaimer.
The Trust Protector’s acting to exercise his power is not refusing any
property interest, nor is the Trust Protector refusing any fiduciary or
administrative powers; to the contrary, the Trust Protector is exercising
such powers. It seems more correct to classify the exercise of the Trust
Protector’s powers as the exercise of a power of appointment, or of
some other power however described.
Although the IRS did not rule on the point, the IRS’s reasoning
and the terms of the trust suggest that a toggle out of a conduit trust and
into an accumulation trust after the determination date might work.
The Service noted that the terms of the trust contained a provision that
addressed the exercise of the Trust Protector’s power after the determination date,161 but it did not discuss the effect of that provision. The
IRS reasoned that because the actions of the Trust Protector were void
ab inito, i.e., to the date that the trust was executed, that the Trust Protector’s action “may be treated as part of [the] Trust. . .” and as “effectuating the Decedent’s written intent as to which beneficiaries were to
receive his IRA. . ., and will not be treated as a post-death action taken
by an individual or entity which negates, modifies or changes Decedent’s. . . beneficiary designation.”162 If the substantive result relates
back to the date of the trust and does not change the MRD amount paid
to the trust beneficiary, it should not be necessary for the Trust Protector to act before the determination date.
Could the Trust Protector, having flipped the toggle to create an
accumulation trust, flip it again to return to a conduit trust? The beneficiaries whose interests were terminated by the Trust Protector’s initial
action probably cannot come back with the second flip of the toggle
since the effect of the first flip was to eliminate them ab initio. It would
seem that the second flip would not add any new beneficiaries (whose
presence would not matter anyway in a conduit trust) or affect the age
of the MRD measuring life (because no older beneficiaries could be
added).

159 See Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimer Law and UDPIA’s Unintended Consequences, 36
EST. PL. 34 (April 2009) (adopted in fourteen jurisdictions in 2009).
160 UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt. (1999).
161 PLR 200537044 (Sep. 16, 2005).
162 Id.
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F. Individual Retirement Annuities
Under the laws of some states, the creditor protection afforded to
an annuity may be greater than that afforded to an inherited IRA. For
example, section 222.14 of the Florida Statutes provides that:
The proceeds of annuity contracts issued to citizens or residents of the state [Florida], upon whatever form, shall not in
any case be liable to attachment, garnishment or legal process
in favor of any creditor of the person. . .who is the beneficiary
of such annuity contract, unless the. . .annuity contract was effected for the benefit of such creditor.163
In re McCollam was certified by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to the Florida Supreme Court.164 In McCollam, the debtor received a personal injury settlement payable in the form of an annuity.
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that, because the payments coming from an
annuity were, in essence, the core of the annuity contract, the payments
were exempt from creditor attachment. Thus, the amounts paid from
the annuity were exempt from the claims of the beneficiary’s
creditors.165
In Florida, anyway, the rationale of McCollam and In re Benedict166
appears to suggest that an IRA owner who is concerned about the beneficiary’s creditors reaching the IRA might consider investing in an individual retirement annuity under IRC § 408(b).
G. Roth IRAs: The Rules Are Different
Although distributions from Roth IRAs are not taxable to the beneficiary,167 there is still a post-mortem MRD requirement.168 However,
because amounts withdrawn from a Roth IRA are not taxable to the
trust, an accumulation trust does not carry with it the income tax baggage of an accumulation trust funded with traditional IRAs or other
retirement accounts. The beneficiary could be given powers of appointment, and older or non-individual beneficiaries could be named, either
of which would be problematic in a traditional accumulation trust.
163

FL. STAT. § 222.14 (2010)
In re McCollam, 955 F. 2d 678 (11th Cir. 1992).
165 Id. at 680.
166 In re Vincent R. Benedict, 88 B.R. 387, 390 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Eileen
F. Benedict, 88 B.R. 390, 393 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (proceeds from creditor-protected
annuity retain their exempt character after payment, Bankruptcy Court reasoning that
“[s]o long as the funds can be properly traced into the account, and are readily accessible
to the debtor, the funds retain their exempt status.”).
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.408A-1, A-2.
168 Id.; see Marcia C. Holt, Traditional Vs. Roth IRAs, TR. & EST., Sept. 2009, at 18,
20.
164
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While this could have the effect of requiring the trustee to withdraw the
Roth IRA under the “five-year rule” or over the life expectancy of an
older beneficiary, withdrawals are not taxable. Therefore, there is no
income tax disadvantage from allowing IRA distributions to be retained
in trust in the trustee’s discretion. Furthermore, withdrawals from the
Roth IRA will not subject the withdrawn funds to income taxes in the
trust.169
V. DECEDENT’S CREDITORS’ REACH OF IRA PAYABLE TO
A TRUST
Making a spendthrift trust the beneficiary of the IRA to provide
creditor protection raises another issue. Even though the IRA is exempt during the owner’s lifetime, are death benefits from an IRA exempt from the claims of creditors against a deceased owner’s insolvent
estate? There have been no bankruptcy cases addressing this situation.
Nevertheless there are some interesting cases decided under non-bankruptcy law.
A. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Bolander
Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Bolander170 was previously unreported
until the Supreme Court of Kansas granted a motion to publish pursuant
to Rule 7.04.171 Section 60-2308 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated
(“KSA”) exempts IRAs as well as qualified plans from an insolvent’s
estate. In Commerce Bank, a decedent’s revocable trust was the beneficiary of the decedent’s IRA, but at the time of the decedent’s death, the
revocable trust held no assets. Also at the death of the decedent, the
decedent’s estate was insolvent with $95,000 in assets but $206,000 in
liabilities. Commerce Bank filed suit against the estate and against the
revocable trust, jointly and severally, for the full amount of debt that the
decedent had incurred. This debt arose out of a secured obligation in
which the decedent signed a promissory note that contained a statement
excluding any of her “IRA or Keogh accounts, or any trust accounts for
which setoff would be prohibited by law.”172
The IRA funds were transferred into the revocable trust five
months and nine months after the decedent’s death, per the beneficiary
designation forms completed by the decedent during the decedent’s lifetime. The district court ruled that in accordance with KSA section 58a169 For a general discussion of the tax effects of Roth IRAs, see Louis A. Mezzullo,
Roth IRAs: Time For a New Look, 36 ACTEC L.J. 317 (2010).
170 239 P.3d 83 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
171 KAN. SUP. CT. R. 7-04 (2010).
172 Bolander, 239 P.3d at 86.
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505: “during the lifetime of the settlor, the property of a revocable trust
is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors.”173 Therefore, the assets of
the trust could be reached by Commerce Bank, even though almost all
of the assets were IRA funds.174
The trustee of the revocable trust argued that the IRA funds were
exempt from judgment for creditors, but the court cited KSA section
58a-505(3), noting that this statute:
[D]oes not shelter. . .funds received by the Trust as beneficiary
of the settlor’s IRAs. The phrase “at the settlor’s death,” refers to whether or not a trust is revocable at the time of the
settlor’s death. The said phrase does not limit those assets of a
trust which are subject to a creditor’s claims.175
Under KSA section 58a-505(3):
After the death of a settlor, and subject to the settlor’s right to
direct the source from which liabilities will be paid, the property of a trust that was revocable at the settlor’s death is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors, costs of administration
of the settlor’s estate,. . .to the extent the settlor’s probate estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims, costs, expenses, and
allowances.176
The court further held that: (1) the exemption that applied to the
IRA during the settlor’s lifetime did not survive her death, (2) the trust
is not owner of an IRA but merely the recipient of funds as the beneficiary of the IRA, and (3) the trust was not a natural person and the statutory exemptions that apply to natural persons do not apply to a trust.177
Interestingly, the court, in dicta, implied that if the IRA had been
paid to a designated beneficiary, the IRA assets might have maintained
their exemption.178 Since, however, the revocable trust was designated
as beneficiary, the IRA was held to be non-exempt.
B. Matter of Gallet
New York law is actually much more protective of employee benefit plans, including IRAs of all types than most other states.
In re Trust of Gallet,179 a 2003 New York Surrogate’s Court case,
held that the Trustee of an irrevocable trust created for the benefit of
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 91.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 93-95.
Id. at 94.
765 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2003).
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the decedent’s daughter could not exercise a discretionary power under
the trust instrument to pay debts of the decedent’s estate if probate assets were insufficient, where the assets of the trust were not otherwise
subject to the direct claims of the creditors after the decedent’s death.180
In this case, the irrevocable trust was established during the decedent’s lifetime and funded with life insurance, an IRA, federal thrift savings death benefit, and a death benefit from a state employee retirement
plan. While the trustee was granted the authority to make discretionary
decisions to pay estate obligations, the overriding fiduciary duty of loyalty to the beneficiary restricted this discretion to prevent the trustee
from paying out claims from trust assets that were otherwise not reachable by creditors. The surrogate held that, in this case, none of the trust
assets were reachable by creditors.
The surrogate reviewed the asset classes individually. The surrogate stated that in New York, the test for creditors’ access to nonprobate
assets is “whether the decedent maintained the power to dispose of the
asset during his or her lifetime.”181 Assets in an IRA are exempt from
satisfaction of money judgments by Civil Practice Law and Rules
(“CPLR”) section 5205 and Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (“EPTL”)
sections 7-3.1 and 13-3.2, unless the assets in the IRA were “fraudulently conveyed” under Article 10 of the Debtor and Creditor Law
(“DCL”).182 CPLR section 5205 exempts from attachment:
c) Trust exemption. 1. Except as provided in paragraphs four
and five of this subdivision, all property while held in trust for
a judgment debtor, where the trust has been created by, or the
fund so held in trust has proceeded from, a person other than
the judgment debtor, is exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment.
2. For purposes of this subdivision, all trusts, custodial accounts, annuities, insurance contracts, monies, assets or interests established as part of, and all payments from, either any
trust or plan, which is qualified as an individual retirement account under section four hundred eight or section four hundred eight A of the United States Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, a Keogh (HR-10), retirement or other plan
established by a corporation, which is qualified under section
401 of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, or created as a result of rollovers from such plans
pursuant to sections 402 (a) (5), 403 (a) (4), 408 (d) (3) or 408A
180
181
182

In re Trust of Gallet, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 160-63.
Id. at 160-61.
DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273-a, 275, 276 (2006).
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of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or a plan
that satisfies the requirements of section 457 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, shall be considered a trust
which has been created by or which has proceeded from a person other than the judgment debtor, even though such judgment debtor is (i) in the case of an individual retirement
account plan, an individual who is the settlor of and depositor
to such account plan, or (ii) a self-employed individual, or (iii)
a partner of the entity sponsoring the Keogh (HR-10) plan, or
(iv) a shareholder of the corporation sponsoring the retirement
or other plan or (v) a participant in a section 457 plan.183
Section 4 of CPLR section 5205 refers to rights of a spouse under a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order, or other domestic relations order.
Section 5 refers to “fraudulent conveyances” where additions to the otherwise exempt assets are made within 90 days before the claim for which
the judgment was entered. The surrogate further held that the continuation of protection for retirement assets after death is implicit in both
statutory and case law.184 EPTL section 13-3.2(a) provides that the
rights of beneficiaries of a pension, retirement, death benefit, stock bonus or profit-sharing plan, system or trust “shall not be impaired or defeated by any statute or rule of law governing the transfer of property by
will, gift or intestacy.”185
C. Matter of King
In re Estate of King186 involved claims by an estate creditor with
respect to an insolvent estate against three non-probate assets: (1) a
term life insurance policy; (2) a NYS Teachers Pension death benefit;
and (3) an I.R.C. § 403(b) retirement account, payable to a designated
beneficiary, the decedent’s son.
The estate argued that EPTL section 13-3.2(a) provides that the
right of a person to receive a pension, retirement, death benefit or annuity is not impaired or defeated by any statute or rule of law governing
the transfer of property by will, gift or intestacy. The court noted, however, that EPTL section 13-3.2(b) references section 273 of the DCL,
which provides that conveyances made without adequate consideration
that render a person insolvent will not be respected, regardless of
intent.187
183
184
185
186
187

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205 (McKinney 2009).
In re Trust of Gallet, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 13-3.2(a) (2006).
764 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sur. Ct. 2003).
In re Estate of King, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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The court then reviewed the anti-alienation rules for each type of
property.188 Federal law covers ERISA plans, but not plans that are
sponsored by state or local governments. Nevertheless, New York insurance law and New York education law have similar anti-alienation
statutes. Thus, the insurance policy and teachers’ pension were
exempt.189
As for the § 403(b) plan, the Surrogate’s court inferred from case
law and statute that this type of account was also covered under EPTL
section 13-3.2 and so was exempt from the decedent’s creditors after
death.190
D. Revocable vs. Irrevocable Trusts
Although Gallet concerned an irrevocable trust, the decision did
not turn on the revocability or irrevocability of the trust, but on the
nature of the assets themselves.191 Many of the cases that made inherited IRAs subject to creditors’ claims of the beneficiary were decided
based on whether or not the funds were moved by the beneficiary from
an IRA that was implicitly exempt under BAPCPA to an inherited IRA,
which the courts determined was not so exempt.192 In these states, it
would seem that whether the beneficiary trust was revocable or irrevocable was irrelevant, but the change in form was paramount. One can
only surmise that in these states, if the beneficiaries do not roll over the
IRA to an inherited IRA and keep it in the name of the deceased
owner, the asset protection should continue. The cost, however, would
be a much shorter distribution period,193 unless the beneficiary is an
individual or an irrevocable trust where the life expectancy of the trust
beneficiary determines the distribution period. In order to avoid successful claims against an insolvent estate or a bankrupt beneficiary,
designating an irrevocable trust that only benefits individuals appears
the best solution for now. Unfortunately, until there is a definitive Supreme Court ruling, none of the proposed methods provide solutions
with certainty.
188

Id. at 521-24.
Id, at 524.
190 Id, at 522-23.
191 In re Trust of Gallet, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 160-61.
192 See, e.g., In re Klipsch, 435 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010); see generally Part II
for a discussion of the various cases decided under BAPCPA.
193 The distribution period is five years, if the deceased owner had not reached her
Normal Retirement Date. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-3, A4(a)(2). The distribution period is the deceased owner’s life expectancy, if she had
reached her Normal Retirement Date. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(i); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(a)(2) & A-5(c)(3).
189
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E. Summary
To avoid potential issues regarding the decedent’s creditors reaching IRAs payable to a trust on death, these levels should be considered:
2. Do not make the IRA payable to the decedent’s estate. The
IRA will clearly be subject to the creditors of the owner’s estate. Furthermore, the estate will not qualify as a designated beneficiary, so this
is a bad result from the income tax aspect as well.
3. Do not make the IRA payable to the decedent’s revocable
trust. This beneficiary designation likely will not provide the most
favorable beneficiary for income tax purposes, and if the IRA becomes
part of the revocable trust residue it is more likely to be reachable by
the decedent’s creditors and thus undermine the IRA creditor exemption otherwise available.
4. Making the IRA payable to a subtrust (e.g. “The GST Trust for
the benefit of my daughter Jane Doe under the John Doe Revocable
Trust”) will provide a designated beneficiary (assuming that trust meets
the requirements of either a conduit or accumulation trust), and will
likely be viewed as passing outside of the trust residue and therefore not
subject to the creditors of the decedent.
5. Making the IRA payable to a stand-alone irrevocable trust may
provide the best protection from the decedent’s creditors if, by virtue of
its irrevocability, the trust is not reachable by the decedent’s creditors
under applicable state law. This technique would use an irrevocable
trust that is only funded under the beneficiary designation on death (if
that constitutes a valid trust under applicable state law) and therefore
can be “revoked” by changing the beneficiary designation, and of course
would be drafted as a designated beneficiary for income tax purposes.
This approach, however, has additional complications associated with
drafting another trust and coordinating that with the decedent’s revocable trust or will.
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EXHIBIT A
STATE STATUTES OPTING OUT OF FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
State

Statute

Date Enacted

ALABAMA
ARIZONA
CALIFORNIA
COLORADO
DELAWARE
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
IOWA
KANSAS
LOUISIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND

May 19, 1980
July 31, 1980
July 1, 1983
July 1, 1981
July 1, 1981
October 1, 1979
March 24, 1980
March 23, 1981
January 1, 1981
April 1, 1980
July 1, 1981
April 26, 1980
October 1, 1979
September 18, 1981
July 1, 1981

OKLAHOMA
OREGON
SOUTH CAROLINA
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
UTAH

ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (2010)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133(B) (2011)
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.130 (2011)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-107 (2010)
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 4914(A) (2010)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (2010)
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100(B) (2011)
IDAHO CODE § 11-609 (2011)
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1201 (2011)
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-55-10-1 (2010)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (West 2010)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (2010)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(B)(1) (2010)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4426 (2009)
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11504(g) (West 2010)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-2 (West 2010)
MO. REV. STAT. § 513.427 (2010)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (2009)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-15, 105 (2010)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.090(3) (2010)
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282 (McKinney
2010)
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1C-1601(f) (West
2010)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (2009)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(17);
2329.662 (West 2010)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1(B) (West 2009)
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.300 (2010)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-35 (2010)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-31-30 (2011)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (2010)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-513 (2010)

VIRGINIA
WEST VIRGINIA
WYOMING

VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (2010)
W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (2011)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-109 (2011)

MISSISSIPPI
MISSOURI
MONTANA
NEBRASKA
NEVADA
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
NORTH DAKOTA
OHIO

July 1, 1991
August, 13, 1982
October 1, 1981
April 17, 1980
May 27, 1981
September 1, 1982
October 1, 1981
July 1, 1981
October 1, 1979
June 25, 1980
November 11, 1981
June 4, 1990
July 1, 1980
June 1, 1980
May 12, 198; originally
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-23-15 but
renumbered by Laws
2008, c. 3, § 809, eff.
Feb. 7, 2008
October 1, 1979
June 23, 1981
March 3, 1980
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EXHIBIT B
STATE EXEMPTION STATUTES

OF

STATE

STATUTE

TYPE

Alabama

Ala. Code § 19-3-1 (2004), repealed
by 2006 Ala. Laws Act 216 page no.
314, § 5, effective January 1, 2007

exempting “qualified trusts,” which
are defined to include IRAs

ALASKA

ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.017 (2007)

exempting an “interest” in or money
“payable” from an IRA “qualified”
under the IRC

ARIZONA

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1126(B) exempting any retirement plan under
(2007)
the IRC

ARKANSAS

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-220 (2007) exempting IRAs unless they do not
“qualify” under the IRC

CALIFORNIA

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.130
(2007)

exempting IRAs “qualified” under
the IRC

COLORADO

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(1)(s)
(2007)

exempting any IRA as “defined”
under the IRC

CONNECTICUT

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-321a (2007)

exempting any IRA “qualified”
under the IRC

DELAWARE

DEL. CODE ANN.
(2007)

exempting any retirement plan
“qualified” under the IRC

FLORIDA

FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 121.131 & 222.21 exempting plans “exempt from
(2007)
taxation” under the IRC

GEORGIA

GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100(a)(2), (2.1) (2007)

exempting any IRA “within the
meaning” of the IRC

HAWAII

HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-124 (2007)

exempting any plan “described” in
the IRC

IDAHO

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-604A (2007) exempting plans “qualified” under
the IRC

ILLINOIS

735 ILL. COMP.STAT.5/12-1006 (2007) exempting plans intended in good
faith to qualify as a retirement plan
under the IRC

INDIANA

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-55-10-2-(c)(6)
(2010)

IOWA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8)(e) & (f) exempting plans established under
(West 2010)
the IRC

KANSAS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2308(b) (2007) exempting plans “qualified” under
the IRC

KENTUCKY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.150(2)(f) exempting IRAs “described” in the
(2007)
IRC “which qualify for the deferral
of. . .tax”

LOUISIANA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:33(1);
13:3881(D) (2007)

TILT.

10 § 4915

exempting plans “not subject to. . .
taxation”

exempting plans, including IRAs,
described as “tax-deferred”
arrangements
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MAINE

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14
§ 4422(13)(E), (F) (2005)

exempting plans “on account
of. . .age. . .unless” the plan “does
not qualify under” the IRC

MARYLAND

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. exempting retirement plans
§ 11-504(h) (2007)
“qualified” under the IRC

MASSACHUSETTS

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34A
(2007)

exempting plans under the IRC

MICHIGAN

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451(1)
(2007)

exempting IRAs “as defined” in the
IRC

MINNESOTA

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(24)
(2009)

exempting IRAs or “plans. . .on
account of. . .age”

MISSISSIPPI

MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(e) (2007)

exempting plans “established to
provide retirement benefits. . .and
qualified under” the IRC

MISSOURI

MO. REV. STAT. § 513.430(1)(10)(e),
(f) (2007)

exempting plans “on account
of. . .age. . .unless” they do not
“qualify” under the IRC

MONTANA

MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-608(1)(e) exempting plans “on account
(2007)
of. . .age. . .unless” they do not
“qualify” under the IRC

NEBRASKA

NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1563.01 (2006) exempting plans “on account
of. . .age. . .unless” they do not
“qualify” under the IRC

NEVADA

NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090(1)(q)
(2005)

NEW HAMPSHIRE

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2 (XIX) exempting “retirement
(2007)
plan[s]. . .qualified for tax
exemption”

NEW JERSEY

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-1 (2007)

exempting plans created or qualified
and maintained pursuant to the IRC

NEW MEXICO

N.M. STAT. § 42-10-1 (2007)

exempting pensions or retirement
funds under the IRC

NEW YORK

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(c) (2007)

exempting IRAs “qualified” under
the IRC

exempting plans which conform with
applicable limitations and
requirements of the IRC

NORTH CAROLINA N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a)(9)
(2007)

exempting plans “as defined in” the
IRC and “any plan treated in the
same manner as an individual
retirement plan under the IRC,
including [IRAs]. . .as described in”
the IRC

NORTH DAKOTA

N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1(3)
(2007)

exempting all plans “qualified” under
the IRC

OHIO

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.66(A)(10) (2007)

exempting plans “on account
of. . .age. . .unless” they do not
“qualify” under the IRC

OKLAHOMA

OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(A)(20)
(2007)

exempting “retirement plan[s] or
arrangement[s] qualified for tax
exemption or deferment” under the
IRC
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OREGON

OR. REV. STAT. § 18.358 (2005)

exempting IRAs, “including one that
is pursuant to a simplified employee
pension, as described in” the IRC

PENNSYLVANIA

42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8124(b) (2007)

exempting “any retirement. . .fund
provided for under” the IRC

RHODE ISLAND

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-264(11) (2007)

exempting IRAs “as defined in” the
IRC

SOUTH CAROLINA S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(12)
(2006)

exempting retirement accounts
described in or established under the
IRC

SOUTH DAKOTA

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-45-17
(2007)

exempting plans “described” in the
IRC

TENNESSEE

TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105 (2007)

exempting “retirement
plan[s]. . .qualified under” the IRC

TEXAS

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021
(2006)

exempting plans “described” in the
IRC

UTAH

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-505
(1)(a)(xiv) (1953)

exempting “retirement plan[s] or
arrangement[s] that [are] described
in” the IRC

VERMONT

VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 12, § 2740(16)
(2007)

exempting IRAs and “all other plans
qualified under” the IRC but only
for contributions, dividends, or other
earnings exempt from taxation

VIRGINIA

VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34 (2007)

exempting plans intended to satisfy
the requirements of the IRC as
determined based on all relevant
facts and circumstances

WASHINGTON

WASH. REV. CODE § 6.15.020 (2007)

exempting plans “described in” the
IRC

WEST VIRGINIA

W.VA. CODE § 38-10-4(j)(5) (2007)

exempting plans “on account
of. . .age. . .unless” they do not
“qualify” under the IRC

WISCONSIN

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 815.18(3)(j) (West exempting plans “providing benefits
2009)
by reason of age” unless they do not
“compl[y] with the provisions of the
[IRC]. . .

WYOMING

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-110 (2007)

exempting plans if they are
“protected from. . .or subject to
deferral” from taxation
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Oklahoma: opt-out state;
Not Exempt: because they do
exempts IRAs “qualified for
not qualify under the IRC for
tax exemption or deferment.” special tax treatment.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, §1(A)(20).

In re Greenfield
California: opt-out state;
Not Exempt: because in order
289 B.R. 146 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. exempts certain retirement
to qualify for an exemption the
2003).
vehicles and “similar plan[s] or IRA must be used for
contract[s] on account
retirement needs.
of. . .age.”
CA. CIV. PROC. CODE
§703.140(b)(10)(E).
In re Navarre
Alabama: opt-out state;
332 B.R. 24 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. exempts “qualified trusts”
2004).
defined to include IRAs. ALA.
CODE 1 9-3-1(b)(1), (4); 19-31(b)(5)(d)(3).

Not Exempt: because the IRC
distinguishes from and treats
inherited IRAs and regular
IRAs differently, thus the
court held that inherited IRAs
do not fall within the Alabama
bankruptcy exemption statute.

In re Taylor,
2006 WL 1275400; 2006 Bankr.
LEXIS 755 (Bankr. C.D. III.
May 9, 2006).

Illinois: opt-out state; exempts
IRAs and other plans
“intended in good faith to
qualify as a retirement plan”
under the IRC.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/121006.

Not Exempt: because they are
treated differently from regular
IRAs under the IRC (not
exempt from being taxed as
gross income, the beneficiary
may make no contributions to
the account, and the
beneficiary can’t roll over the
inherited IRA into another
retirement plan).

In re Kirchen
344 B.R. 908 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 2006).

Wisconsin: opt-out state;
exempts debtors interest in (1)
some type of retirement
account; (2) providing benefits
by reason of age, illness,
disability, death or length of
service; that (3) complies with
the IRC.
WIS. STAT. § 815.18(3)(j).

Not Exempt: because being
required to take distributions
from the IRA without regard
to age not equivalent to being
penalized for receiving them
and, therefore, right to
payments under an inherited
IRA are not on account of
age.

In re Jarboe
Texas: not an opt-out state;
365 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. debtor opted for state
2007).
exemption which states that an
IRA must qualify under the
applicable provisions of the
IRC before it will be exempt.
TEX. PROP. CODE § 42.0021.

Not Exempt: because it could
not be rolled over, no
contributions could be made to
it, all distributions must have
been taken from the account
within 5 years or lifespanmeasured withdrawals and,
perhaps most importantly,
distributions could be taken
from it at any time, for any
reason, without penalty.
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In re McClelland
, 2008 WL 89901; 2008 Bankr.
LEXIS 41 (Bankr. D. Idaho
Jan. 7, 2008).

Idaho: an opt-out state;
exempts IRAs and any other
right accrued or accruing to
any citizen of the state of
Idaho under any employee
benefit plan.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1 1604A.

Was Exempt: because
exemption not meant only to
“protect retirement money
earned and held by the
account owner”, the legislature
did not limit the exemption to
the person who opened and
contributed to the account
when it could have done so.

Robertson v. Deeb 16 So. 3d
936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Florida: an opt-out state;
provides that “money or other
assets payable to an owner, a
participant or beneficiary” are
exempt from “all claims of
creditors” if held in a “fund or
account” maintained as an
IRA exempt from taxation
under the IRC. FLA. STAT.
§ 221.21 (2007).

Not Exempt: because
protection under Florida law
applied only to the original
IRA account, and the tax
consequences of inherited
IRAs and moving money to a
new account resulted in the
creation of a new unprotected
account (suggesting that the
debtor may have won if he left
the assets in the original IRA
account.

In re Chilton
2010 WL 817331 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. March 5, 2010).

Texas: not an opt-out state;
debtor elected the federal
exemption which exempts
whatever is exempted under
the applicable state law plus
“retirement funds to the extent
that those funds are in a fund
or account that is exempt from
taxation under sections 401,
403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or
501(a) of IRC.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12).

Not Exempt: because inherited
IRAs are no funds intended
for retirement purposes since
they are available to the
beneficiary without regard to
age or retirement status.

In re Nessa
Minnesota: not an opt-out
2010 Bankr. LEXIS 931
state; the debtor elected the
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). federal exemption which
exempts whatever is exempted
under the applicable state law
plus “retirement funds to the
extent that those funds are in a
fund or account that is exempt
from taxation under sections
401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457,
or 501(a) of IRC.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12).

Was Exempt: because the
transfer to the inherited
account was a trustee-totrustee transfer as described in
the IRS’s Publication 590 and
thus the funds retained their
character as retirement funds.
The bankruptcy trustee
appealed and the 8th Circuit
affirmed holding that an
inherited IRA is still a
retirement account protected
by law, despite the fact that it
has switched hands from the
original owner to the
beneficiary.

In re Klipsch, 435 B.R. 586
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2010).

Indiana: opt-out state

Not Exempt: an inherited IRA
cannot be rolled over and is
not a retirement plan under
the IRC or Indiana law.

In re Tabor, 433 B.R. 469
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010).

Pennsylvania: the debtor
elected both the state and
federal exemption.

Was Exempt: court stated that
both the state and federal
exemptions were the same for
this purpose and followed In re
Nessa.

